Generating Combat Airpower:
Air Force JAGs and the Evolving USAF Units of Action

On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine, initiating a war that shows no signs of abating in the near term. President Xi Jingping of the People’s Republic of China, meanwhile, ordered the Chinese military to prepare to invade Taiwan by 2027, a prospect that threatens even greater conflict and worldwide instability.[1] As the War on Terror concludes, the United States Air Force finds itself re-optimizing for high-end international conflict as it has not experienced since at least the end of the Cold War.[2] Having comfortably conducted air operations against terrorists and insurgents for two decades in permissive operating environments, the Air Force now finds itself faced with determined adversaries who rival American military power and technology.

To counter these emerging threats, the Air Force developed the Air Force Force Generation (AFFORGEN) model. Air Combat Command (ACC) first implemented AFFORGEN through the Lead Wing construct, a tailored force structure capable of rapidly generating combat air power. In turn, the Air Force next implemented experimental Air Task Forces (ATFs) and the cutting-edge Deployable Combat Wing (DCW).[3] While new and still evolving, these combat wing constructs were designated and assigned to each of the four AFFORGEN phases. Corresponding to their phase allocations, they have performed training, have undertaken complex exercises and certification events, and are available to commit to worldwide deployments for military contingencies. As such, the Air Force JAGs assigned to wings implementing these constructs are already involved in executing AFFORGEN.

As new creations, the Lead Wing, ATF, and DCW have presented new roles and opportunities for JAGs. This article discusses these constructs, their part in advancing airpower and strategic deterrence in relation to the AFFORGEN model, and drawing on experiences from JAGs assigned to them, what role an Air Force JAG might expect to play in a combat wing. While the combat wing construct continues to evolve and may take on different forms, or even be replaced entirely in the future, the lessons learned thus far are salient for JAGs in the emerging era of strategic competition, thus far colloquially referred to as Great Power Competition (GPC). 
 

What is AFFORGEN?

AFFORGEN is envisioned as a reliable, sustainable force generation model geared towards a high-end fight. It shifts the paradigm away from the Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) crowdsourced design where individual Airmen deployed piecemeal and worked together for the first time in theater. The nature of counter-insurgency operations and their relatively low threat to U.S. air assets, coupled with installations being largely shielded from attack, allowed that model to succeed during the War on Terror. The prospect of war with a lethal near-peer adversary, however, means the U.S. can no longer rely on the shelter of a limited number of secured airfields whose locations are known and that resemble CONUS Air Force bases with disparate units spread across the base. The need for maximum combat readiness, rapid worldwide deployability, and complex survivability tactics necessitated a seismic shift in posture. AFFORGEN answered this need.[4]

The architecture and policies underlying AFFORGEN as of January 2025 are found within AFI 10-401, Operations Planning and Execution. Under the AFFORGEN model, “operational forces are properly organized, trained, equipped, and ready to respond to emerging crises and sustained operations.”[5] For maximum preparedness, forces will come from standardized wing-level force elements that train together before deploying together. The AFFORGEN force posture contains four 6-month phases that establish a 24-month rotational pattern of readiness.

The four phases are “Prepare,” “Certify,” “Available,” and “Reset,” each indicating the expected level of readiness. 

• Prepare Phase: Forces concentrate on basic “training goals and improving manpower and equipment deficiencies.”[6] 
• Certify Phase: Forces are expected to achieve a “baseline level of combat proficiency and the ability to respond to contingencies.”[7] 
• Available Phase: Forces are vulnerable to deploy for real-world operations. 
• Reset Phase: Forces focus on “reintegration and reconstitution. The force elements are no longer available to support combat operations. The primary focus is on resiliency.”[8]

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AFFORGEN provides combat capabilities through Force Elements (FEs). Each FE answers a specific mission requirement within the deployed theater. The AFFORGEN FEs are:

• Open the Air Base FE,
• Establish the Air Base FE,
• Operate the Air Base FE,
• Robust the Air Base FE,
• Command and Control (C2) FE,
• Mission Generation (MG) FE, and
• Demand Force Teams (DFTs).[10]

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The First-Generation Unit of Action: The ACC Lead Wing

The Lead Wing was ACC’s first effort at tailoring a method of implementing AFFORGEN. ACC defined Lead Wings as “designated garrison Wings that will be presented as an AEW-capable HQ with a supporting ABS [Air Base Squadron] and MG FEs. LWs [Lead Wings] are an ACE-capable, DFE [Dynamic Force Employment]-ready operational Wing that integrates into CCMD [Combatant Command] C2 architectures to support JFACC [Joint Forces Air Component Commander] mission priorities. It is organized, trained, and equipped to deploy from a home station IAW [In Accordance With] Immediate Response Force (IRF) readiness table requirements.”[13] Breaking that down, a Lead Wing was a wing trained in ACE and ready to deploy on short notice to meet emergent international military threats. It was intended to enact ACE and survive to generate airpower through executing the Air Tasking Order (ATO) from one Main Operating Base (MOB), up to two Forward Operating Sites (FOSs), and up to six Contingency Locations (CLs). Per ACC, a Lead Wing’s mission was to “provide the JFACC with an ACE-capable operational Wing, trained as a team that can deploy within an IRF-like timeline, defend and operate the air base, and generate mission capability for up to 30 days during combined and joint operations.”[14]

On 5 January 2022, Gen Mark Kelly, Commander, Air Combat Command (COMACC), identified five wings to be ready to “rapidly generate combat power as a deployed force,”[15] thereby establishing the Lead Wings. They were the 4th Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina; 23rd Wing, Moody AFB, Georgia; 55th Wing, Offutt AFB, Nebraska; 355th Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona; and 366th Fighter Wing, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. Gen Kelly remarked, “This shift takes us from a reactive force optimized for counter-insurgency ops over the past twenty years in permissive environments, to wings ready to deploy as high-performing, task-organized combat teams, and operate in a contested environment with joint and coalition partners.”[16] The Lead Wings occupied different phases of the AFFORGEN cycle such that they were vulnerable to real-world contingency deployments at different times. This iterative approach to occupying the “Ready” phase allowed each Lead Wing to build off the training and lessons learned from the previous wings, thereby building institutional knowledge and raising the overall readiness level and lethality of U.S. airpower.

A Lead Wing was tailorable, but its primary components aligned with the AFFORGEN model and included an expeditionary C2 FE, any number of MG FEs, and an ABS. In a Lead Wing, the C2 FE was organized as an A-staff and served as the Lead Wing HQ while the MG FEs provide combat support capabilities. The ABS, meanwhile, was “the LW’s organic source of CS [Combat Support] with the capability to facilitate LW operations at a single MOB and an associated FOS …. It [was] predominantly sourced from ACS [Agile Combat Support] Airmen at a single LW from garrison squadrons assigned to the Wing.”[17] ABS Airmen were sourced from numerous garrison squadrons. Among other functions, the ABS was expected to provide airfield operations, base security and defense, logistics, force support, finance and contracting, munitions, medical, and communications.

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Two points should be noted regarding a Lead Wing.

First, whereas the AFFORGEN model envisions wing level Open the Air Base and Establish the Air Base FEs, the Lead Wing construct presumed these FE mission sets will already be executed when the Lead Wing arrives in theater. The Lead Wing CONOP explained, “In order for the LW to ACE operations, CCMDs are required to establish the Air Base (EAB) and Set the Theater (STT) … ensuring all actions in the Open/EAB FM are completed by theater-assigned or other forces is critical to the LW’s ability to generate combat power in the OAB FM.”[19] While the ABS was prepared to create FOSs and CLs, the ABS was not intended to open or establish a MOB.

Second, a Lead Wing, as well as the later ATF and DCW models, was not a replacement for the Air Operations Center (AOC). While these combat wing constructs could be forced to operate without the AOC and are prepared for such a situation were the AOC to be destroyed or communications knocked out, they are not substitutes for the AOC. Rather, they are expected to carry out the AOC’s ATO by executing ACE operations. As the Lead Wing explained, “It aligns and executes IAW the existing JFACC C2 structure’s established theater Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE) plan and conditions-based authority (CBA) …. When cut off from HHQ, such as the AOC, the LW C2 FE will generate tasking orders for subordinate FP/FEs under its control, IAW the CCMD’s scheme of maneuver and its delegated CBAs.”[20]
 

The Next Generation Units of Action: The Air Task Force and Deployable Combat Wing

Building on the demonstrated success of the Lead Wing, the Air Force next looked to implement similar constructs across the service, giving rise to the ATF and DCW models. On 15 May 2024, the Air Force designated six institutions to host experimental ATFs—Davis Monthan AFB, Scott AFB, Joint Base San-Antonio, Dyess AFB, Fairchild AFB, and Seymour Johnson AFB.[21] Just as in a Lead Wing, “These pathfinding ATFs will work and train together throughout their AFFORGEN cycle to ensure they are at peak effectiveness on Day-1 of any deployment,” as Chief of Staff General David Alvin explained As in the Lead Wing, the ATF will occupy different phases of AFFORGEN to best maximize training, readiness, and recuperation.[22] Mirroring the Lead Wing construct, ATFs were structured with a command element, A-Staff and Special Staff, Combat Air Base Squadron (CABS), and MG FEs.[23] New to the scene were Mission Sustainment Teams (MSTs), which would “provide sustainment and protection for the portions of a MGFE moving forward to one or more locations. The MSTs may be able to augment the CABS when at a Main Operating Base.”[24]

Even further down the runway, the DCW construct aims to maximize power projection capability with 24 wings fielded—16 Active Duty and 8 Reserve wings.[26] Envisioned as the next evolution of the Lead Wing and ATF, “Each DCW will have a redesigned concept of support for GPC schemes of maneuver, including Agile Combat Employment, to ensure the wings are prepared to execute their wartime functions and missions with assigned Airmen and units.”[27] The DCW would continue the philosophy of stationing the necessary force elements together at the same installation to train and equip and thereby best prepare to deter and fight future conflicts.

With the shift to GPC, the Air Force has seen a rapid evolution of strategic doctrine and force posturing constructs. As new ideas have been fielded and refined, older constructs have quickly been replaced by new models. Especially with the paradigm shifting effect of emerging technology and, in 2025, it is possible, even likely, that the ATF and DCW models currently being fielded may evolve form again or even give way to yet unseen constructs entirely. While JA practitioners must continuously keep abreast of these fast-paced changes, knowledge of the combat wing’s recent evolution and the lessons learned thus far are valuable to know what issues are likely to arise in the field as we prepare for the next fight.
 

What is Agile Combat Employment (ACE)?

Integral to both AFFORGEN and the evolving Units of Action is ACE, a “proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability while generating combat airpower.”[28] In other words, ACE is an operational strategy to move aircraft, personnel, and equipment to frustrate the enemy’s targeting sequence. Doctrine explains that “When applied correctly, ACE complicates the enemy’s targeting process, creates political and operational dilemmas for the enemy, and creates flexibility for friendly forces.”[29] ACE is a revolutionary new way of thinking about combat airpower and requires a shift away from the counter-terrorism strategies that have dominated the last two decades of air operations.

The ACE strategy is critical in an engagement where the enemy can strike U.S. air bases, thereby degrading air operations. While the U.S. generated airpower uncontested during the War on Terror, the Air Force cannot expect to continue to do so against enemies such as China and Russia, who have arsenals of long-range, accurate stand-off weapons such as air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), and late-generation aircraft. ACE is the response to such capabilities—“ACE shifts operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning and provide more options for joint force commanders.”[30]

Though a component of AFFORGEN and the evolving Units of Action, ACE is distinct in that ACE is a strategy for fighting a war whereas AFFORGEN and the new constructs are mechanisms to enable ACE. In other words, ACE doctrine guides actions and operations in theater to engage and defeat the enemy, while AFFORGEN and its related constructs are the vehicles used to organize and train Air Force assets and to get forces into theater so they can execute ACE.
 

The Air Force JAG’s Evolving Role in the Combat Wing

Member of the Special Staff

In the combat wing organizational scheme, JA is a member of the Special Staff. As seen in the Lead Wing, “As part of the Special Staff, the Judge Advocate provides legal counsel to the AEW/CC and staff as required, advising the AEW/CC on all matters affecting AF operations across all legal domains.”[32] At its core, the JA function is to enable effective and lethal decision making by advising on a range of legal issues. At home station, this means JA coordinates with the A-staff on exercise and training planning, attends A-staff meetings, and participates in exercises. While nested underneath classic group and squadron hierarchies, during exercises and deployments in the combat wing models JA personnel would be embedded with the C2 FE and sit on the Wing Operations Center (WOC) floor during 24-hour operations with shifts split between one JAG and one paralegal.

Advise on Legal Issues

JAGs would be expected to advise on any legal issue that arises should the combat wing deploy. While that is broad, exercise participation over the last years sheds some light on what issues JAGs may face. These include advising on the Rules of Engagement (ROE), the Law of War (LoW), international law, detention/apprehension, and targeting, in addition to participating in joint staff groups such as the Threat Working Group (TWG) and Information Warfare Working Group (IWWG).
 

Rules of Engagement

The ROE shape mission planning and the use of armed force in military operations, and JAGs are a critical component to ensuring they are properly drafted and understood. While specific ROEs are likely to come down from the AOC-level, combat wing JAGs are responsible for tracking them, interpreting them, making sure personnel understand what they mean, and advising should any questions arise about their execution. Combat wing JAGs should be thoroughly familiar with the self-defense and status-based conditions in the ROE under which personnel can use deadly force. They should train and ensure all personnel in the combat wing understand these principles.

Law of War

Related to the ROE is LoW. Combat wing JAGs would be responsible for ensuring personnel are familiar with the basic principles of LoW: necessity, proportionality, distinction, humanity, and honor. Unlike in the AOC, combat wing JAGs will not likely be engaged in deliberative targeting development—that will remain with the AOC. They may, however, be called upon to advise on dynamic targeting, especially if communications with the AOC are degraded or the AOC itself is destroyed, a distinct possibility in a peer fight. In addition to targeting, LoW issues relating to enemy prisoners of war (POWs), including what rights they are afforded and how they should be processed, have arisen in exercises, in addition to issues relating to the status of protestors, non-state actors, and foreign intelligence operatives, all of which may been seen in the AOR and directly implicate combat wing operations.

International Law

A prominent area in every exercise has been international law, specifically regarding Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), treaties of mutual cooperation and law enforcement assistance, and base access agreements. A combat wing JAG must have a thorough understanding of any such agreements at play in the entire theater where the combat wing might operate. While a MOB-type location is likely to be a known installation, FOS and CL-type locations, which are intended to disperse assets and increase survivability while generating airpower, may be in any variety of nations. Knowing what agreements are in place and what they allow is critical to ensuring airfield access and operability, base security, logistics and supply from local nations, and how threats, such as protestors or drones, can be handled.

Military Justice Matters

As exercise scenarios have unfolded, a variety of smaller issues have also arisen including basic military justice matters, waiver authorities for DAFI/DAFMAN provisions, mishap response plans, mortuary affairs, fiscal law, civil law, and even basic legal assistance. The combat wing JAG has, for example, advised on commander’s options for security violations, whether bottled water for base personnel can be purchased with Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds, whether National Security Administration (NSA) support can be requested to conduct cell phone monitoring and analysis, who can legally sign death certificates, how the Air Force should respond to a lawsuit or claim for damage caused to foreign civilian property, how commanders can respond to ground or air accidents, big “T” versus little “t” training for foreign military forces[33], and what authorities a commander can execute or delegate, among other matters.

Threat Working Group and Information Warfare Working Group

Lastly, a combat wing JAG could be a critical member of entities such as the TWG and IWWG, as seen in the Lead Wing model. The TWG was a collaborative effort between OSI, SFS, PA, JA, and other A-staff directorates to identify and respond to myriad real-world threats, especially at the FOS and CL locations, which are more vulnerable than the MOB because they are less well-established. The IWWG meanwhile planned “Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) to conceal, reveal, or suggest specific information to specific audiences …. IWWG tasks may include signature management, electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) awareness, rapid reprogramming, operations security (OPSEC), camouflage, concealment, deception, and MDS mission assurance.”[34] While strict legal issues might not arise in either the TWG or IWWG, the analytical capabilities lawyers provide in addition to thinking outside the box can be invaluable to successful combat wing operations.
 

Lessons Learned: Ensuring Legality and Enhancing Lethality

One lesson learned is the need for multi-capable JAGs with proficiency in a breadth of legal fields and the ability to spot issues, conduct analysis, and give sound advice, all while exposed to real combat dangers. As explored above, a combat wing JAG can expect to advise on issues spanning the gamut of civil law, military justice, and operational law. Many issues arise without warning and require rapid advice due to dynamic situations unfolding in real time. And considering peer-adversary capabilities, a JAG deployed with a combat wing can expect to operate in a fast-paced environment subject to hostile enemy fire, degraded or destroyed communications that reduce reach back capability, and limited resources. As discussed above, the base is no longer a sanctuary from heavy attack. Combat wing JAGs and paralegals must appreciate that they will be part of a war against an adversary armed with accurate, powerful stand-off weapons such as TBMs and ALCMs. This means they will be on the front lines even if hundreds of miles from enemy territory, especially given that C2 nodes are anticipated targets for enemy attacks.
 

Another lesson learned is the need for a dedicated JAG who can regularly attend A-staff meetings and exercise with the host combat wing. This regular interaction builds crucial interpersonal relationships that will be invaluable for communication and mission execution should a combat wing deploy to a chaotic, hostile environment. The Lead Wing CONOP, for example, encouraged this relationship development: “These components should be teamed in garrison to ensure an opportunity to train together in the AFFORGEN Prepare/Ready phases and then be ready to support rapid deployment as a unified force in the Available-to-Commit phase.”[35] At least one Lead Wing, the 366th Fighter Wing, held weekly A-staff meeting and conducted exercises at least every other month. This frequency underscores the need for a dedicated JAG lest the combat wing C2 FE personnel constantly need to re-establish relationships at the cost of efficiency and trust.

Fortunately, the JAG Corps deployment construct is well postured to support combat wing operations and deployment taskings. Per the authority of 10 U.S.C. § 806, “TJAG, acting through AF/JAX, is the sourcing and adjudication authority for the deployment of judge advocates and paralegals. Subordinate JA Functional Area Managers represent TJAG and AF/JAX at their respective commands and execute TJAG and AF/JAX direction.”[36] In practice, this manifests as SJAs prioritizing personnel for deployments and TJAG/JAX acting on those prioritization recommendations. Recognizing the new AFFORGEN and combat wing constructs, DAFI 51-101 provides, “To the maximum extent possible, the AFJAG Corps will source taskings for judge advocates and paralegals to deploy as part of an AFFORGEN force element from the same wing or installation tasked to provide the core of the force element.”[37] Doing so maximizes JAG/paralegal availability and interaction with their combat wing, and thus establishes maximum readiness. Base-level JAGs and paralegals interested in combat wings or operational law should express that interest to their SJAs, who are best positioned to align personnel in accordance with the four phases applicable to their installations.[38] SJAs are also then best able to plan for how to best pair base-level JAGs and paralegals so maximum readiness and cohesion can be built among the legal team.
 

Lastly, combat wing JAGs must operate with the mentality that they are force enablers. This means that while they certainly must ensure all actions are legal, they need to focus on getting to yes whenever possible. JAGs sometimes develop a reputation for being “no” people, with commanders responding by minimizing or marginalizing the JAG. Indeed, sometimes the answer is in fact no and very little can be done about that. A JAG with the mentality, however, that he or she will do everything possible to get the commander to yes will be seen as an asset that advances the mission and will thus be sought out for advice and be brought into the decision-making process.
 

Conclusion: Generating Airpower

The Air Force is closing the chapter on the War on Terror. A new chapter is beginning, this one characterized by confrontation with powerful near-peer adversaries like Russia and China. The prospect of warfare against such adversaries has made the Air Force shift how it trains and mobilizes forces to quickly deploy into theater and generate combat airpower. Answering this requirement is AFFORGEN, a four-phase approach that enables the Air Force to train for and execute ACE operations. The Air Force has implemented AFFORGEN through Units of Action including the Lead Wing, Air Task Force and Deployable Combat Wing, tailorable force packages designed to rapidly enter the AOR and execute ACE. These new constructs, which continue to evolve and whose final form may not yet be known, have opened new opportunities for JAGs to practice operations law and advise on decision making processes to both ensure legality and enhance lethality, all while potentially serving on the front lines in the next war against the enemies of freedom and the liberal world order.
 

Acronyms

• A1: Manpower and Personnel
• A2: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations
• A3: Operations
• A4: Logistics
• A5: Plans and Requirements
• A6: Communications
• AB:  air base
• ABS: Air Base Squadron
• ACC: Air Combat Command
• ACE: Agile Combat Employment
• ACS: Agile Combat Support
• AEW: Air Expeditionary Wing
• AFB:  Air Force base
• AFFORGEN: Air Force Force Generation
• AFI: Air Force instruction
• AFJAG: Air Force Judge Advocate General
• ALCM:  air-launched cruise missile
• AOC:  air operations center
• AOR:  area of responsibility
• ATF: Air Task Force
• ATO:  air tasking order
• C2:  command and control
• CABS: Combat Air Base Squadron
• CBA: conditions-based authority
• CC:  commander
• CCC: Command Chief
• CCF: First Sergeant
• CCMD:  combatant command
• CD:  deputy commander
• CL: contingency location
• COMACC: Commander, Air Combat Command
• CONOP:  concept of operations
• CONUS:  continental United States
• CoS: Chief of Staff
• CRE:  contingency response elements
• DAF: Department of Air Force
• DAFI: Department of Air Force Instruction
• DAFMAN: Department of Air Force Manual
• DCW: Deployable Combat Wing
• DFE: Dynamic Force Employment
• DFT: Demand Force Team
• EAB: Establish the Air Base
• EMEDS:  expeditionary medical support system
• EMS: electromagnetic spectrum
• FE:  force element
• FM: financial management
• FOS:  forward operating site
• GPC: Great Power Competition
• HHQ: higher headquarters
• IAW:  in accordance with
• IRF: Immediate Response Force
• ISR:  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
• IWWG: Information Warfare Working Group
• JA: judge advocate
• JAG: judge advocate general
• JAX: JAG Corps Professional Development Division
• JFACC:  joint forces air component commander
• LoW: Law of War
• LW: Lead Wing
• MDS: mission design series
• MG: Mission Generation
• MGFE: Mission Generation Force Element
• MOB:  main operating base
• MST:  mission sustainment team
• NSA: National Security Administration
• OAB: Operate the Air Base
• OIE: Operations in the Information Environment
• OPSEC: operations security
• OSI: Office of Special Investigations
• PA: public affairs
• PACE:  primary, alternate, contingency, emergency plan
• POW: prisoner of war
• ROE:  rules of engagement
• SFS:  security forces squadron
• SJA: Staff Judge Advocate
• SOFA:  Status of Forces Agreement
• STT: Set the Theater
• TBM:  theater ballistic missile
• TJAG: The Judge Advocate General
• TWG: Threat Working Group
• WOC:  wing operations center

About the Author

Major Vincent W. Abruzzese

(B.A., Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia; M.A., The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.; J.D., University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia) is an instructor in the Operations and International Law Division at The Judge Advocate General’s School.

 

Endnotes